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Shipp et al.: Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems

UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
THE EUROPEAN COURT of Human Rights
(Court) was established in 1959 by the
European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(Convention). Enforcing the obligations
entered into by the Council of Europe’s
Contracting States, the Court is composed of a
number of judges equal to the number of
Contracting States. Any Contracting State or
individual may lodge a complaint with the
Court for violations of the Convention. In its
decisions, the Court acknowledges the various
legal systems of the Contracting States.
With the accession of numerous
Contracting States since 1990, the Court
has been inundated with applications. The
number of applications registered with the
Court grew from 404 in 1981 to 13,858 in
2001. The increase in the Court’s caseload
threatens its ability to adjudicate applications in a timely fashion. Widespread academic and institutional debate has sought to
determine what measures should be taken to
adapt the Court’s procedures to the demands
of an insurmountable caseload.
Much of the debate has focused on
whether the individual right of application
should be sacrificed in cases where the Court
can serve as an advisor to national governments in remedying the cause of the complaint at the national level. Advocates of this
approach stress that Article 13 of the
Convention requires that national authorities provide an effective remedy for violations of the Convention. Opponents of this
approach, however, stress that Article 34 of
the Convention mandates an individual
right to lodge an application with the Court.
The Court has recently moved to redress
faulty or malfunctioning national legislation
that is systemic in nature and affects many
individuals by developing a “pilot judgment”
program. Pilot judgment allows the Court to
address many applications that share a common cause of action without rendering individual judgments or directly awarding damages to the complainants. Under pilot judgment, the Court is permitted to circumvent

individual applications and issue directives
to the respondent government to remedy a
legislative or administrative defect at the
national level. Thus, through the use of the
pilot judgment program, the Court can
address an entire class of meritorious applications without directly providing a remedy.
The Court has developed pilot judgment in
response to the Council of Europe’s hesitancy to adopt a new Protocol that would permit the Court to modify its procedures for
multiple claims with a common cause of
action that can be remedied by state action
at the national level.
If the pilot judgment scheme takes hold,
the Court will be forced to effect a general
reform of its procedures to ensure adequate
remedial measures, or “just satisfaction.”
Article 41 entitles applicants to just satisfaction when the remedy at the national level is
lacking or inadequate. If the Court adopted
an approach that included implementing an
advisory body for national governments, the
Court would have to redefine its relationship
to national courts and legislatures under the
Convention. Currently, there is no procedure for referring a violation back to a
national body from the Court.

BRONIOWSKI V. POLAND
On June 22, 2004, the Court delivered
its judgment in Broniowski v. Poland, and on
September 23, 2005, the Court issued a
friendly settlement judgment in the case.
The Court issues a friendly settlement judgment when the parties to a dispute have successfully negotiated a remedy that addresses
the violation and reflects the findings of the
Court in its review of the application.
At the close of the Second World War,
the Polish state ceded a vast strip of land
stretching from present-day Vilnius to areas
southeast of Lvov, now located in the western region of present-day Ukraine, to the
Soviet Republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and
Lithuania. This territory is commonly
known as the “territories beyond the Bug
River.” In its statement to the Court in the
Broniowski proceedings, the Polish government estimated that approximately
25

1,240,000 individuals were displaced as a
result of the ceding of this land, and that,
notwithstanding the post-war grant of portions of German land along Poland’s western
border, the area of the Polish state had been
reduced by nearly 20 percent.
The Polish government devised a plan to
compensate those who had lost their property and land to the Soviet Union. New legislation accorded displaced persons the right
to offset the value of the property lost in
relocation against the price of property that
they might bid upon in a sale of state assets.
For each displaced person, the Polish government assessed the value of the property
that was surrendered and issued certificates
to determine the credit that was available for
the purchase of state property.
In Broniowski, the Court held that
Poland had violated Article 1 of the
Convention by failing to fulfill its obligation
to provide property or the “right to credit” in
compensation for land abandoned at the end
of the Second World War in the territories
beyond the Bug River. The Court cited
numerous administrative and legislative barriers to the realization of the property interest that was guaranteed to the “evacuees” in
treaties with the Soviet Republics of
Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. According
to the Court, Poland’s inaction and obstruction had rendered the property interest
worthless.
Traditionally, the Court has enforced
remedial measures that provide for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. In
Broniowski, however, the Court did not
directly provide a remedy to the applicant.
The Court reserved Broniowski for further
review, adjourned all other claims based on
the same cause, and directed Poland in very
general terms to “secure the implementation
of the property right in question in respect
of the remaining Bug River claimants or
provide them with equivalent redress in lieu,
in accordance with the principles of protection of property rights under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.” The Court “invited the
Government and the applicant to submit,
within six months from the date of notifica-
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tion of [this] judgment, their written observations on the matter and, in particular, to
notify the Court of any agreement that they
may reach.” The Court’s decision acknowledged the 167 Bug River claims pending
before the Court, as well as the approximately 80,000 potential claimants under the
same cause who had yet to make a claim
against the Polish state.

whether the Court will use pilot judgment as
a means to efficiently redress similar claims
with a common cause, as in Broniowski, or
to take on a more active role in ensuring that
legislative and administrative practices at the
national level conform to Convention standards. Thus, the Broniowski decision could
have significant implications for the future
of the Court’s jurisdiction.

Subsequent to the Broniowski decision,
which directed the Polish government to
redress the situation at the national level, the
Polish Constitutional Court delivered a
judgment on December 15, 2004, regarding
a claim by Members of the Polish Parliament
that challenged the constitutionality of the
laws and administrative practices that inhibited the realization of the Bug River property interests. The Polish Constitutional Court
found that the laws in question were unconstitutional and inhibitive of the property
rights of the Bug River evacuees. Further, the
Polish government passed the July 2005 Act,
which guarantees realization of the Bug
River claimants’ property interests.

It is open to debate whether the Court
will continue to adjudicate individual claims
on a case-by-case basis or expand upon the
Broniowski precedent by addressing classes of
claims with a pilot judgment that directs
national governments to correct inadequate
national legislation and administration. The
utility of pilot judgments is evident given
the increasing number of claims brought
before the Court. The shift toward a more
efficient court system, however, may not
provide sufficient redress for individual
harms. For the time being, the Broniowski
friendly settlement has postponed the necessity of directly addressing these issues. By
acting to ensure the realization of the Bug
River claimants property interests as mandated by the Court, the Polish government’s
actions indicate that the Court’s pilot judgment program has substantial and direct
influence over legislative and administrative
practices at the national level.

In the Broniowski friendly settlement
judgment, the European Court of Human
Rights quoted the Polish Constitutional
Court’s decision at length and noted that the
July 2005 Act was passed “with a view to
taking account of the findings of the
[European Court of Human Rights] principal judgment” in Broniowski. The European
Court of Human Rights struck Broniowski’s
application from its list of cases, holding that
the complaint had been remedied at the
national level and no longer required the
Court’s attention. The European Court of
Human Rights noted, however, that it
would follow legislative developments in the
matter to ensure that the settlement between
the parties was satisfactory.
In the initial Broniowski judgment prior
to the friendly settlement of the case, the
Court had rendered pilot judgment on the
grounds that Poland had violated Article 1
because of “a systemic problem connected
with the malfunctioning of domestic legislation and practice.” The language of the
holding is very broad and could potentially
be applied to many situations. Considering
that the legal systems of many of the new
Contracting States are undergoing major
transitions, such malfunctioning legislation
is likely to be common. It is not clear

EDITOR’S NOTE: Due to space constraints, the
decision summarized below was unable to run
in the Spring 2005 issue of the Human Rights
Brief.

STEEL AND MORRIS V. THE UNITED
KINGDOM
On February 15, 2005, the Court delivered its judgment in Steel and Morris v. The
United Kingdom. In a unanimous decision
the Court held that the appellants, Helen
Steel and David Morris, had suffered violations of Article 6 (Right to a Fair Hearing)
and Article 10 (Freedom of Expression) of
the Convention as a result of the British government’s refusal to provide them with legal
aid as defendants in a libel suit brought
against them by the McDonald’s
Corporation.
The case grew out of Steel and Morris’
involvement in an anti-McDonald’s campaign initiated by London Greenpeace in
the mid-1980s. A six-page brochure produced by the organization entitled “What’s
26

wrong with McDonald’s?” accused the corporation of contributing to economic imperialism, malnourishment within developing
countries, rainforest destruction, animal
cruelty, and the exploitation of children. In
response, the company issued a writ for libel
against Steel and Morris and three other
Greenpeace members, claiming more than
GBP 100,000 in damages. Although proceedings were withdrawn against the other
three members in exchange for an apology,
the case against Steel and Morris proceeded
to trial in the United Kingdom High Court
in June 1994. In defense Steel and Morris
denied responsibility for publishing the
brochure, denied that the statements complained of were defamatory, and argued in
the alternative that the statements were
“substantially true or else were fair comment on matter of fact.”
Prior to trial Steel and Morris had
applied for legal aid from the British government. The British government denied legal
aid because public legal assistance was not
available for defamation proceedings at that
time. Despite some ad hoc assistance offered
by volunteer lawyers and public donations,
Steel and Morris represented themselves
throughout the trial and appeal and bore all
costs. The trial lasted for 313 court days and
remains the longest trial in English history.
In June 1997 Justice Bell delivered his
opinion, finding Steel and Morris liable for
the brochure’s false and defamatory messages. He awarded McDonald’s GBP 60,000
in damages. The Court of Appeal subsequently heard the case in January 1999. In
their appeal Steel and Morris noted that corporations like McDonald’s “must be open to
unfettered scrutiny and criticism, particularly on issues of public interest.” The Court of
Appeal accepted some of the challenges to
Justice Bell’s findings regarding the truthfulness of the brochure and reduced the damages to GBP 40,000. The House of Lords
denied Steel and Morris further appeal.
Steel and Morris’ application with the
European Court of Human Rights was
lodged on September 20, 2000, declared
partly admissible on April 6, 2004, and
heard on September 7, 2004. Their principal
complaint was that the denial of legal aid
prevented a fair trial, thus violating Articles
6 and 10 of the Convention. Article 6 provides that “everyone is entitled to a fair and
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public hearing” and Article 10 protects the
right to freedom of expression, including the
right to “hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority.”
With respect to Article 6, the British government argued that Steel and Morris might
not have been granted legal aid, even if it
had been available for defamation suits at
the time. Further, the British government
stated that the law and facts at issue were not
sufficiently difficult to render legal aid essential. The Court affirmed that Article 6 allows
states to choose the means used to guarantee
the right to a fair trial and gives states the
power to impose certain conditions for
granting legal aid. The Court noted, however, that the present case was unique because
“the applicants did not choose to commence
defamation proceedings, but acted as defendants to protect their right to freedom of
expression, a right accorded considerable
importance under the Convention.”
Because the proceedings were complex,
Steel and Morris’ lack of legal training led
them to make a number of procedural mistakes that resulted in severe financial consequences. The Court concluded that “neither
the sporadic help given by the volunteer
lawyers nor the extensive judicial assistance
and latitude granted to the applicants … was
any substitute for competent and sustained
representation by an experienced lawyer
familiar … with the law of libel.” The Court
further noted that the question of whether
legal aid, assuming it had been available,
would have been granted to the applicants
was a “matter of pure speculation.” Even if
the request for aid had been denied or granted conditionally, the Court noted that similar issues would arise, such as “whether the
refusal of legal aid or the conditions attached
to it were such as to impose an unfair restriction on the applicants’ ability to present an
effective defense.” Therefore, the Court concluded that the British government’s denial
of legal aid deprived Steel and Morris of the
opportunity to present their case effectively
and contributed to an “unacceptable
inequality of arms” with McDonald’s sufficient to constitute an Article 6 violation.
With respect to the Article 10 judgment,
the central issue was whether the British
government’s denial of legal aid also constituted an impermissible “interference by

public authority” with Steel and Morris’
freedom of expression. Steel and Morris
emphasized the inter-relationship between
Articles 6 and 10, arguing that they unfairly
bore the burden of proving the truth of the
brochure’s allegations without legal aid. Steel
and Morris also argued that to require “strict
proof ” of every allegation was “contrary to
the interests of democracy … because it
would compel those without the means to
undertake court proceedings to withdraw
from public debate.” The British government countered that because Steel and
Morris were not journalists they should not
receive the high level of protection afforded
by Article 10 and that they had violated the
Article’s “good faith” proviso by not carrying
out sufficient research prior to publishing
the brochure. The Court agreed with the latter argument but noted the “strong public
interest in enabling [small and informal
campaign] groups and individuals outside
the mainstream to contribute to the public
debate” in a democratic society. The Court
concluded that Article 10 protection should
not be limited to journalists.
By presenting the anti-McDonald’s
brochure as a statement of fact rather than a
value judgment, the Court reasoned that
Steel and Morris had overstepped certain
bounds “in respect of the reputation and
rights of others” and should be subject to
similar standards of factual accuracy, even if
a certain degree of hyperbole was “to be tolerated” in a campaign leaflet. The Court
was not persuaded by Steel and Morris’
argument that McDonald’s should be precluded from bringing suit because it is a
multinational company. Given a state’s
interest in “protecting the commercial success and viability of companies… for the
wider economic good,” the Court affirmed
that the defendant should bear the burden
of proof in libel suits.
Nevertheless, to “safeguard the countervailing interests in free expression and open
debate,” the Court noted that the provision
of such a remedy to corporate bodies must
be tempered by procedural fairness and an
equality of arms at trial. “Given the enormity and complex nature of that undertaking,”
the Court held that the “correct balance”
was not struck between the need to protect
Steel and Morris’ right to freedom of expression and the need to protect McDonald’s
“rights and reputation.” This balance was all
27

the more important in light of the possible
“chilling effect” this could have on the circulation of information about the activities of
powerful corporate entities. The Court concluded that the lack of procedural fairness
and equality also gave rise to a breach of
Article 10.
Pursuant to Article 41 (Just Satisfaction)
of the Convention, the Court ordered
Britain to pay EUR 20,000 in non-pecuniary damages to Steel and EUR 15,000 in
non-pecuniary damages to Morris for the
general “anxiety and disruption to their lives
far in excess of that experienced by a represented litigant.” The Court also ordered
Britain to pay court costs of EUR 47,311.
The Court rejected Steel and Morris’ request
for a “rider” to cover their liability to
McDonald’s. The Court did not consider
pecuniary damages because Steel and Morris
failed to show any lost earnings as a result of
their lack of legal aid.

INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
INTER-AMERICAN Human Rights

THE
System was created with the adoption of the
American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man (Declaration) in 1948. In
1959 the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (Commission) was established as an independent organ of the
Organization of American States (OAS) and
it held its first session one year later. In 1969
the American Convention on Human
Rights (Convention) was adopted. The
Convention further defined the role of the
Commission and created the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (Inter-American
Court). According to the Convention, once
the Commission determines that a case is
admissible and meritorious, it will make recommendations and, in some cases, present
the case to the Inter-American Court for
adjudication. The Inter-American Court
hears these cases, determines liability under
relevant regional treaties and agreements,
and assesses and awards damages and other
forms of reparation to victims of human
rights violations.
In June 2005 the Inter-American Court
decided two important cases related to the
rights of indigenous peoples in the
Americas. In Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, the
Yakye Axa indigenous community sought
possessory rights over the community’s
ancestral lands, which Paraguay had prom-
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ised to them for more than a decade. In
Yatama v. Nicaragua, the sole indigenous
political party in Nicaragua sought recognition as a political entity in the country’s elections and to increase indigenous representation in the Nicaraguan political system.

YAKYE AXA V. PARAGUAY
On June 14, 2003, the Commission and
representatives of the victims brought a suit
before the Inter-American Court claiming
that Paraguay violated the rights of the Yakye
Axa indigenous community by breaching
Articles 4 (Right to Life), 8 (Right to a Fair
Trial), 21 (Right to Property), and 25 (Right
to Judicial Protection) of the Convention.
The allegations stated that since 1993
Paraguay has failed to guarantee the Yakye
Axa community a possessory right to their
ancestral property, which has created an environment of nutritional, medical, and sanitary
vulnerability. The Commission and the representatives of the victims also noted that
Paraguay’s procedures for filing complaints
and guaranteeing property rights to the
Yakye Axa community were ineffective.
Article 4 of the Convention guarantees
that “every person has the right to have his
life respected.” Article 8 provides that “every
person has the right to a hearing, with due
guarantees and within a reasonable time”
and Article 21 ensures that “everyone has the
right to simple and prompt recourse.”
Article 25 states that “everyone has the right
to the use and enjoyment of his property.”
The Inter-American Court ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs and held that the long delay in
returning the land to the Yakye Axa community constituted a failure of duty to protect
the community, thus violating judicial protection. The Court ordered that Paraguay
offer effective protection to the indigenous
community’s customs, as well as their economic and political characteristics. It also
ordered Paraguay to monitor the community’s vulnerabilities.
Paraguay must now recognize rights that
are associated with the right to property. For
the first time, the Inter-American Court
acknowledged that communal property of
indigenous communities closely relates to
indigenous traditions and expressions, customs, rituals, values, art, and relationships
with nature. These rights will be violated if a
community has reduced access to their lands.

The Inter-American Court also found
that exclusion of the Yakye Axa community
from their traditional lands for the past 12
years had endangered their survival. These
conditions, the Inter-American Court
observed, have negatively impacted the
nutrition and health of the Yakye Axa community members, especially children. The
Court held that these problems result from
violations of the right to a dignified existence
and other basic rights, such as the right to
education and the right to a cultural identity.
To measure damages, the Inter-American
Court assessed the victims’ lost incomes and
the expenses incurred by the court action.
Considering the value of the land to the
Yakye Axa community, the Inter-American
Court asked Paraguay to create a program
and a community fund for development that
should be implemented when the land is
returned to the community. Finally, the
Inter-American Court asked for a public act
of recognition of responsibility, communicated in the Enxet and Spanish (or Guarani)
languages.

YATAMA V. NICARAGUA
In the 1990s Nicaragua passed a law that
excluded electoral candidates affiliated with
the sole national indigenous political party,
Yatama, from voting. The representatives of
the victims and the Commission alleged that
the Nicaraguan Court violated Articles 8
(Right to a Fair Trial), 24 (Right to Equal
Protection), and 25 (Right to Judicial
Protection) of the Convention. Article 8
provides that “every person has a right to a
hearing, with due guarantees and within a
reasonable time.” Article 24 ensures that “all
persons are equal before the law” and Article
25 states “everyone has the right to simple
and prompt recourse.”
The Inter-American Court decided the
merits of Yatama v. Nicaragua on June 23,
2005. In its decision, the Inter-American
Court observed that Yatama candidates were
not included on the ballots, posing a risk to
the country’s democratic political system
and violating the Convention. By preventing
Yatama candidates’ access to the ballots, the
government impeded indigenous communities from voting for the only indigenous and
ethnic political party in Nicaragua. The
Court reasoned that such exclusion amounted to an alienation of the indigenous popu28

lation from the political system, as evidenced
by the 2000 municipal elections, where only
20 percent of the indigenous community
voted. As a result of the exclusion of Yatama
candidates from the electoral process and its
effect on the civil rights of indigenous peoples, the Inter-American Court ruled that
the Nicaragua also violated Articles 8, 23,
24, and 25 of the Convention.
According to the Inter-American Court,
Nicaragua engaged in political and legal discrimination by preventing the equal participation of Yatama candidates in the municipal elections of November 2000. For example, under the January 2000 reforms to the
Electoral Law, candidates must gather signatures equivalent to three percent of the voters that registered in the past election, as well
as represent individuals in 80 percent of
Nicaragua’s municipalities, to gain ballot
access. This is virtually impossible to satisfy
for the Yatama community candidates. The
Court ordered that the Nicaraguan government ensure the Yatama community’s access
to the political system and allow their integration into the state’s organs and institutions in a direct and proportional manner.
To guarantee the effectiveness of the
political rights of members of indigenous
and ethnic communities of the Atlantic
Coast, the Inter-American Court noted the
importance of adopting the protections
specified in Articles 4, 49, 89, and 180 of
the Political Constitution, as well as Article
11.7 of the Statute for Autonomy of the
Atlantic Coast Regions. Article 4 of the
Nicaraguan Political Constitution provides
for governmental recognition of indigenous
communities and their rights. Article 49
enables communities of the Atlantic Coast
to create organizations that advance their
own interests. Articles 89 and 180 grant
these communities the right to preserve and
develop their cultural identity and preserve
their historic traditions. Finally, Article 117
of the Statute for Autonomy establishes
that members of the Atlantic Coast have a
right to select their autonomous regional
authorities.
The Inter-American Court ordered that
Nicaragua publish in its official newspaper
and other newspapers of national circulation
portions of the Court’s order. These portions
of the Court’s order and a national recognition of responsibility must also be transmit-
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ted via radio in the three indigenous languages of the region — Miskito, Sumo, and
Rama — as well as in Spanish and English.
Further, the Court held that Nicaragua must
create, within a reasonable time, a judicial
resource that is simple, speedy, and effective
to regulate the decisions of the Supreme
Electoral Council, which is the co-equal
branch of government that controls elections. Ultimately, Nicaragua should modify
its electoral rules and clearly establish the
Yatama community’s right to become a
political party.
With regard to the Yatama candidates
excluded from elections, the Inter-American
Court ordered that Nicaragua pay $80,000
for all material damages and expenses they
incurred as a result of the litigation. It also
recognized the importance of political acts,
such as public recognitions of the wrongs
committed and the adoption of measures
that would include the participation of
indigenous communities of Nicaragua’s
Atlantic Coast in the electoral process in
accordance with the communities’ values,
customs, and rights.
By recognizing the importance of the
right to land and tradition, Yakye Axa and
Yatama reflect the Inter-American Court’s
increasing protection of the rights and values
of indigenous peoples. The Inter-American
System has also taken important steps in
promoting the rights of indigenous communities by ensuring their ability to gain greater
political access, which in turn will guarantee
a more inclusive democracy.

AFRICAN COMMISSION
AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM

THE
began to take shape under the Organization
of African Unity (OAU), which was founded in 1963. The African Union (AU)
replaced the OAU in July 2001 following
the ratification of the AU’s Constitutive Act.
The African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights (Charter), entered into force in 1986,
established the African Commission on
Human and People’s Rights (Commission),
which is responsible for interpreting all provisions of the Charter. The Commission
meets twice annually to consider periodic
reports, as well as complaints brought
against State Parties to the Charter. At the
time of writing, the proposed African Court
on Human and People’s Rights, established
in 2004 as a court for enforcement of the

Charter, was not yet operational (see below).

AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLE’S RIGHTS
The 37th Ordinary Session of the
African Commission on Human and
People’s Rights was held from April 27 May 11, 2005, in Banjul, Gambia. The
Commission continued discussions on the
July 2004 decision of the African Union to
merge the Commission’s proposed African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(ACHPR) with the AU’s African Court of
Justice, and passed a resolution on the
Protocol addressing the establishment of
the ACHPR. The Commission noted that
the two Courts have essentially different
mandates and litigants. It expressed concern that the decision to merge them, and
the non-ratification of the Protocol by the
majority of the AU Member States, has
hindered establishment of the ACHPR.
The Commission noted that the AU
Executive Council’s January 2005 decision, EX.CL/Dec.165 (VI), allows the
ACHPR to continue functioning, notwithstanding discussions on the merger. It
asked the Assembly of the Heads of State
and the Government of the African Union
to implement the ACHPR as soon as possible by electing judges, choosing the seat
of the Court, and providing adequate
resources. It also called on Member States
that have not yet done so to ratify the
Protocol. Although 42 of the 53 Member
States have signed the Protocol, only 15
have ratified or acceded to it.
The Commission adopted Resolutions
on the human rights situations in Darfur,
Sudan, and Togo. The Resolution on Darfur
requested that the government of Sudan
comply with its obligations under the
Constitutive Act of the African Union, the
United Nations Charter, and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights to
continue its cooperation with international
agencies and humanitarian organizations
and to cooperate fully with the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court (ICC). It
also called on parties to the conflict to
observe the terms of the Ceasefire
Agreements in Ndjamena, Chad, and to
stop all attacks on civilians immediately.
Finally, it asked the UN Security Council to
continue monitoring the implementations
of its resolutions and the international com29

munity to help meet the AU’s logistical,
material, and financial needs in responding
to the crisis. The Resolution on Togo
announced a decision to send a fact-finding
mission to investigate human rights violations occurring before, during, and after the
April 2005 election of Faure Gnassingbe,
son of the recently deceased Togolese president, Gnassingbe Eyadema.
The Commission adopted a Resolution
to create a working group to review its rules
of procedure (including internal and external relationships), establish a Voluntary
Fund for Human Rights in Africa, and follow-up on the evaluations, recommendations, decisions, and structure of its reports.
Finally, the Commission granted Observer
Status to an additional 13 NGOs, bringing
the total number of organizations with such
status to 332. The 38th Ordinary Session of
the Commission will be held from
November 21 - December 5, 2005. HRB
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